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The development of the field of strategic management within the
last two decades has been dramatic. While its roots have been in a more
applied area, often referred to as business policy, the current field of
strategic management is strongly theory based, with substantial empir-
ical research, and is eclectic in nature. This review of the development
of the field and its current position examines the field’s early develop-
ment and the primary theoretical and methodological bases through its
history. Early developments include Chandler’s (1962) Strategy and
Structure and Ansoff’s (1965) Corporate Strategy. These early works
took on a contingency perspective (fit between strategy and structure)
and a resource-based framework emphasizing internal strengths and
weaknesses. Perhaps, one of the more significant contributions to the
development of strategic management came from industrial organiza-
tion (IO) economics, specifically the work of Michael Porter. The
structure-conduct-performance framework and the notion of strategic
groups, as well as providing a foundation for research on competitive
dynamics, are flourishing currently. The IO paradigm also brought
econometric tools to the research on strategic management. Building on
the IO economics framework, the organizational economics perspective
contributed transaction costs economics and agency theory to strategic
management. More recent theoretical contributions focus on the re-
source-based view of the firm. While it has its roots in Edith Penrose’s
work in the late 1950s, the resource-based view was largely introduced
to the field of strategic management in the 1980s and became a domi-
nant framework in the 1990s. Based on the resource-based view or
developing concurrently were research on strategic leadership, strate-
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gic decision theory (process research) and knowledge-based view of the
firm. The research methodologies are becoming increasingly sophisti-
cated and now frequently combine both quantitative and qualitative
approaches and unique and new statistical tools. Finally, this review
examines the future directions, both in terms of theory and methodol-
ogies, as the study of strategic management evolves. © 1999 Elsevier
Science Inc. All rights reserved.
The evolution of the field of strategic management since its inception has
been impressive. From its “humble” beginnings as the limited content of a
capstone general management course in the business school curriculum,1 strategic
management is now a firmly established field in the study of business and
organizations. During a relatively short period of time, this field has witnessed a
significant growth in the diversity of topics and variety of research methods
employed. While proliferation of topics and methods is generally encouraging,
reflecting the vigor of the field, it is also worthwhile at this juncture to review the
state of theory and research, examining accomplishments, and preparing for
continued progress in the next century.
Owing to its roots as a more applied area, strategic management has tradi-
tionally focused on business concepts that affect firm performance. Herein, the
key theories and topics of strategic management along with the methods used in
its study are reviewed. The field of strategic management is eclectic in nature, but
with the recent development of the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm (e.g.,
Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984), it has, once again, increased emphasis on firms’
internal strengths and weaknesses relative to their external opportunities and
threats. Calls for the use of qualitative methods to identify a firm’s resources are
increasing as each firm is considered to have a distinctive bundle of resources.
This approach often uses single case studies as used in instruction and by early
strategy scholars (e.g., Learned, Christensen, Andrews, & Guth, 1965/1969) to
study particular firm strategies or industry structure. Thus, we ask the question:
Has the field of strategic management come back to its roots similar to the swing
of a pendulum? To explore this question, this article traces and reviews the
various major stages of developments in strategic management as an academic
field of study over the last several decades. The emphasis is on the prominent
theories developed and the corresponding methodologies employed in past and
current strategic management research. Moreover, we explore how the field will
continue to develop in the future. First, a historical overview of the development
of strategic management is provided, tracing the field’s disciplinary roots and
depicting various swings of the pendulum.
Historical Overview
Theoretically, the recent rise of the RBV (e.g., Barney, 1991; Conner, 1991;
Wernerfelt, 1984), together with the two closely related content areas: the knowl-
edge-based view (e.g., Kogut & Zander, 1992; Spender & Grant, 1996); and
strategic leadership (e.g., Cannella & Hambrick, 1993; Finkelstein & Hambrick,
1996; Kesner & Sebora, 1994) have returned attention to the internal aspects of
418 THEORY AND RESEARCH IN STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT
JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, VOL. 25, NO. 3, 1999
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016jom.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
the firm. Internal firm characteristics represented the crucial research domain in
the early development of the field. Early strategy researchers, such as Andrews
and his colleagues (Learned et al., 1965/1969) and Ansoff (1965), were predom-
inantly concerned with identifying firms’ “best practices” that contribute to firm
success. This emphasis on internal competitive resources can be traced to the early
classics such as Chester Barnard’s (1938) The Functions of the Executives, Philip
Selznick’s (1957) Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Perspective, or
Edith Penrose’s (1959) The Theory of the Growth of the Firm. Researchers in this
stream share an interest in pondering the inner growth engines or “the black box”
of the firm, and argue that a firm’s continued success is chiefly a function of its
internal and unique competitive resources.
In between the early development of the field in the 60s and the rise of the
RBV in the 1980s, however, the pendulum had swung to the other extreme and
only recently has started to return. Developments in the field beginning in the
1970s fostered a move toward industrial organization (IO) economics (e.g.,
Porter, 1980, 1985), with its theoretical roots based on Bain (1956, 1968) and
Mason (1939). This swing shifted the attention externally toward industry struc-
ture and competitive position in the industry. For example, the adoption of IO
economics led to the development of research on strategic groups where firms are
classified into categories of strategic similarity within and differences across
groups (e.g., Hunt, 1972; Newman, 1973; Porter, 1973). IO economics considers
structural aspects of an industry, whereas work on strategic groups is largely
focused on firm groupings within an industry. Strategic groups research continues
to be a focus, especially by the population ecologists building on the aforemen-
tioned work.
Reemergence of internal firm characteristics was evident in the emphasis on
competitive dynamics and boundary relationships between the firm and its envi-
ronment (e.g., Chen, 1996; Gimeno & Woo, 1996; Karnani & Wernerfelt, 1985).
Although this sub-field has borrowed more substantially from the theories of IO
economics, mainly oligopolistic competition (e.g., Edwards, 1955) and game
theory, strategic management research on competitive dynamics uses actual firms
and environments for the theory and data (D’Aveni, 1994), rather than abstract
simulations. Compared to standard IO economics, it moves much closer to the
firm and direct competitive rivalry between specific firms in the competitive
environment (Chen, 1996).
Also, with a focus on boundary relationships, the field began to emphasize
transaction costs analysis (Williamson, 1975, 1985), which examines the firm-
environment interface through a contractual or exchange-based approach. In a
similar vein, agency theory, also contractual or exchanged-based, suggests that the
firm can be viewed as a “nexus of contracts” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Both
transaction costs economics (TCE) and agency theory have their roots in Ronald
Coase’s (1937) influential essay “The Nature of the Firm,” and especially agency
theory evolved from the insights found in The Modern Corporation and Private
Property (1932) by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means. TCE has fostered much
research on firm boundaries, markets versus hierarchies. For example, this work
has led to many studies on the adoption of the multidivisional structure (for a
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review, see Hoskisson, Hill, & Kim, 1993), and vertical integration and strategic
alliances (Kogut, 1988). Additionally, a substantial amount of studies on corpo-
rate governance has been spawned by agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Hosk-
isson & Turk, 1990). Both of these perspectives have been used to examine a
variety of topics, such as mergers/acquisitions, divestitures, and downscoping
(e.g., Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1990; Hoskisson & Hitt, 1994), greenmail (e.g.,
Kosnik, 1990), and leveraged buyouts (e.g., Wiersema & Liebeskind, 1995).
Methodologically, the pendulum appears to have swung back towards the
use of more qualitative approaches, at least ideally. The case method was
preferred by the early strategy scholars. There was little attempt to generalize
the findings of a case to strategy making in general, except for problem-
solving skills. Largely because of this approach, strategic management was
not regarded as a scientific field worthy of academic study. As the field
embraced IO economics, it began to emphasize scientific generalizations
based on study of broader sets of firms. Additionally, strategy researchers
increasingly employed multivariate statistical tools (e.g., multiple regression
and cluster analysis), with large data samples primarily collected from sec-
ondary resources to test theory. The development of strategic management
into a more “respected” scholarly field of study was at least partially a result
of the adoption of “scientific” methods from IO economics. The development
of the RBV, nevertheless, poses a major methodological problem to strategic
researchers (Hitt, Gimeno, & Hoskisson, 1998). In many respects, the study of
the RBV requires a multiplicity of methods to identify, measure and under-
stand firm resources, purported to reside within the boundary of a firm. More
importantly, RBV proponents suggest that each firm may have distinctive
resources that contribute to sustained competitive advantages. The “received”
method of research using large data samples, secondary data sources, and
econometric analyses appear to be inadequate, particularly when used to
examine intangible firm resources, such as corporate culture (Barney, 1986b)
or tacit knowledge (Kogut & Zander, 1992). Because of the focus on a firm’s
idiosyncratic resources, generalizability of firm knowledge may be question-
able. Although strategic management has advanced theoretically through the
RBV, the methods that complement this theoretical view are less certain and
need further development. Figure 1 illustrates the various historical emphases
in the field using the metaphor of swings of a pendulum. In the following
sections, we review the past and the current developments of strategic man-
agement regarding theories and methodologies, and also examine how the
field is likely to develop in the future.
Early Development
During the period of early development, a number of scholars made signif-
icant contributions to the later development of the field of strategic management,
known, at that time, as business policy. Among the most important works are
Chandler’s (1962) Strategy and Structure, Ansoff’s (1965) Corporate Strategy,
and Learned et al.’s (1965/1969) Business Policy: Text and Cases.
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Although not explicitly mentioned on most occasions, the footprints of the
earlier classics in management can be found during this early period of work on
the forerunner of strategic management. For example, Barnard’s (1938) detailed
exposition of the cooperation and organization in business firms, as well as the
managerial functions and processes therein, provided a solid foundation upon
which subsequent works in strategic management were built. The crucial impor-
tance of “distinctive competence” and leadership emphasized in Selznick’s (1957)
study in administrative organizations coincided well with early strategy scholars’
focus on firms’ internal strengths and managerial capabilities. Penrose (1959)
related firm growth and diversification to the “inherited” resources, especially
managerial capacities, a firm possesses. Her proposition complemented Chan-
dler’s (1962) findings on the growth of the firm.2 From a behavioral perspective,
Herbert Simon’s (1945) Administrative Behaviors, and Cyert and March’s (1963)
A Behavioral Theory of the Firm also provided input into the early development
of strategic management (Ansoff’s, 1965, Corporate Strategy is a good example).
They emphasized organizations’ internal processes and characteristics, such as
decision-making processes, information-processing limitations, power and coali-
tions, and hierarchical structures. In many respects, it is likely that the early
development of strategic management thinking has been influenced, at least to a
certain extent, by these early classics’ detailed expositions of organizations’
internal processes and focus on the important roles of managers.
Figure 1. Swings of a Pendulum: Theoretical and Methodological Evolution in
Strategic Management
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Early Theories
An important year for the field of strategic management was 1962 when
Chandler’s seminal work, Strategy and Structure, was published (Rumelt, Schen-
del, & Teece, 1994). Chandler’s work focused primarily on how large enterprises
develop new administrative structures to accommodate growth, and how strategic
change leads to structural change. According to Chandler, strategy is “the deter-
mination of the basic long-term goals and objectives of an enterprise, and the
adoption of courses of action and the allocation of resources necessary for
carrying out the goals,” while structure is “the design of organization through
which the enterprise is administered” (1962: 13–14). Changes in strategy are
mainly responses to opportunities or needs created by changes in the external
environment, such as technological innovation. As a consequence of change in
strategy, complementary new structures are also devised. Moreover, the book also
illuminates vividly the active role of managers in pursuing strategic changes and
exploring new administrative structures.
In the preface to his book, Ansoff describes that its main focus is on strategic
decisions, defined as “decisions on what kind of business the firm should seek to
be in” (1965: viii). He views strategy as the “common thread” among a firm’s
activities and product-markets and is comprised of four components: product-
market scope, growth vector (or the changes that a firm makes in its product-
market scope), competitive advantage, and synergy.
Andrews and his colleagues considered business policy as “the study of the
functions and responsibilities of general management and the problems which
affect the character and success of the total enterprise” from the viewpoint “of the
chief executive or general manager, whose primary responsibility is the enterprise
as a whole” (Learned et al., 1965/1969: 3). More importantly, they define strategy
as “the pattern of objectives, purposes, or goals and major policies and plans for
achieving these goals, stated in such a way as to define what business the company
is in, or is to be in and the kind of company it is or is to be” (1969: 15). They also
suggest that corporate strategy is composed of two interrelated, but practically
separated, aspects: formulation and implementation. The challenge in formulation
is to identify and reconcile four essential components of strategy: (1) market
opportunity; (2) firm competence and resources; (3) managers’ personal values
and aspirations; and (4) obligations to segments of society other than the stock-
holders. This broad definition of strategy is in accord with that of Chandler, but
incorporates Selznick’s (1957) “distinctive competence” and the notion of an
uncertain environment (Rumelt et al., 1992). After the strategy is formulated,
implementation is concerned with how resources are mobilized to accomplish the
strategy and requires appropriate organization structure, systems of incentives and
controls, and leadership. To Andrews and colleagues, implementation is “com-
prised of a series of subactivities which are primarily administrative” (1969: 19).
The three seminal works by Chandler, Ansoff, and Andrews and his col-
leagues, respectively, provide the foundation for the field of strategic management
(e.g., Rumelt et al., 1992). Collectively, they help define a number of critical
concepts and propositions in strategy, including how strategy affects performance,
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the importance of both external opportunities and internal capabilities, the notion
that structure follows strategy, the practical distinction between formulation and
implementation, and the active role of managers in strategic management. While
there existed disagreements regarding these concepts that remained to be further
specified and developed (Hofer & Schendel, 1978), together these three works
advanced the domain of strategy beyond the traditional focus of merely a capstone
course about functional integration. Rumelt et al. provides an apt description:
“Nearly all of the ideas and issues that concern us today can be found in at least
embryonic form in these key writings of the 1960s” (1994: 18). However, Rumelt
et al. (1994) overlook the contributions of Thompson (1967). He first introduced
the notion of cooperative and competitive strategies and coalition formation, a
forerunner of network and strategic alliance strategies. Also, his work contributed
to the understanding of implementation of corporate strategy through his notion of
interdependence between business units. Pooled, reciprocal, and serial interde-
pendence are associated with the corporate strategies of unrelated diversification,
related diversification and vertical integration, respectively. Although these writ-
ings form a foundation for strategic management, they were mostly process-
oriented to facilitate case examination, the main methodological tool of study at
the time.
Early Methodologies
Works by Ansoff and Andrews, among others during the period, emphasized
the normative aspect of business knowledge and are chiefly interested in identi-
fying and developing the “best practices” that were useful for managers. The
target audience of their work was managers and students aspiring to be managers.
Their principal goal was to impart knowledge to practitioners, rather than to
pursue knowledge for scientific advancement. In Business Policy: Text and Cases,
Andrews and his colleagues described this viewpoint clearly. To them, it is
impossible to “make useful generalizations about the nature of these variables or
to classify their possible combinations in all situations” because there are a large
number of variables unique to a certain organization or situation that guide the
choice of objectives and formulation of policy (1969: 5). The study of business
policy provides a familiarity with an approach to the problems, and together with
the skills and attitudes, one can “combine these variables into a pattern valid for
one [italics added] organization” (1969: 5). The most appropriate method for
accomplishing this objective is inductive in character: in-depth case studies of
single firms or industries. Generalization is practically infeasible or desirable, as
each case is assumed to be too complex and unique. In addition, these authors
were skeptical about the purposes of other academic disciplines, such as engi-
neering, economics, psychology, sociology, or mathematics. These disciplines
may not be appropriate for strategy studies because “Knowledge generated for
one set of ends is not readily applicable to another” (Learned et al., 1965/1969: 6).
Therefore, they concluded that the most valid methodology to achieve their
purpose was case studies, inasmuch as the (then) strategy research had not yet
advanced enough to capture significant attention. The cases used were very
detailed; in the 1969 edition of Learned et al.’s Business Policy, there is a set of
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twelve cases on Olivetti plus a note on the Office Machine Industry, totaling about
180 pages.
In comparison, Chandler’s Strategy and Structure is less normative or
prescriptive in nature, although the research methods employed are still inductive
(Rumelt et al., 1994). Chandler mainly used a historical approach to produce a
detailed account of four large firms (Du Pont, General Motors, Standard Oil of
New Jersey (later known as Exxon), and Sears Roebuck), considered to be
representative to derive his thesis and propositions. Most of the information on the
firms was gathered from publicly available sources, internal company records, and
interviews. Interestingly, prior to the in-depth case studies of the four firms, an
extensive survey of a larger number of firms had been conducted to provide initial
knowledge of the business patterns of large U.S. enterprises. Subsequent to the
case studies, Chandler extended the scope of the case study to conduct a com-
parative analysis among four firms to investigate what and why enterprises
adopted or rejected the multidivisional structure. Therefore, unlike Andrews and
Ansoff, Chandler attempted to seek generalizations regarding his thesis across a
wider population of firms.
Overall, the approaches used by prominent strategy scholars during this
foundation period were mainly normative or prescriptive in purpose, with in-depth
case analysis as the primary research tool. To the extent that generalization is one
of the goals, it is primarily achieved through induction (Rumelt, Schendel, &
Teece, 1991), perhaps facilitated by comparative studies of multiple cases similar
to Chandler’s approach. However, in many circumstances, generalization was not
a goal nor was it deemed feasible, as maintained by Andrews and his colleagues.
Unfortunately, the heavy emphasis on the case approach and lack of gener-
alization did not provide the base necessary for continued advancement of the
field. As such, the work in this area was not well accepted by other academic
fields. The need for a stronger theoretical base and for empirical tests of the theory
to allow generalization produced a swing of the pendulum. Furthermore, much of
the early work examined firms largely as closed systems. However, businesses, as
all organizations, are open systems (Thompson, 1967). Thus, an open systems
approach to understanding strategy was necessary. Because of its appropriate fit
and advanced development, the swing moved toward use of economic theory to
examine strategic management phenomena. Schendel and Hatten (1972) argued
for a broader view of strategic management that emphasized the development of
new theory from which hypotheses could be derived and empirically tested. An
early example of this work was Rumelt’s (1974) study. Rumelt’s (1974) large
sample study examined the relationship between the type of strategy and structure
adopted and firm performance. His research paved the way for many subsequent
studies in this area using quantitative methods.
The Swing towards Industrial Organization (IO) Economics
During the next developmental period, strategic management departed sig-
nificantly theoretically and methodologically from the early period. Although
Jemison (1981a) advocated that strategic management could be an amalgam of
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marketing (Biggadike, 1981), administrative behavior (Jemison, 1981b), and
economics (Porter, 1981), the field moved primarily towards economics in theory
and method. During this swing, the influence of economics, particularly industrial
organizational (IO) economics, on strategy research was substantial, and in terms
of methodology, strategy research also became much more “scientific.” This
swing changed strategy research from inductive, case-studies largely on a single
firm or industry, to deductive, large-scale statistical analyses seeking to validate
scientific hypotheses, based on models abstracted from the structure-conduct-
performance (S-C-P) paradigm (also known as the Bain/Mason (Bain 1956, 1968;
Mason, 1939) paradigm. The most widely adopted IO framework in strategic
management gave rise to the rich body of research on “strategic groups.”
In the preface to the first edition of Industrial Organization, Bain stated that
the book (or IO economics in general) was concerned with “the economywide
complex of business enterprises . . . in their function as suppliers, sellers, or
buyers, of goods and services of every sort produced by enterprises” and “the
environmental settings within which enterprises operate and in how they behave
in these settings as producers, sellers, and buyers.” He also suggested that his
approach was basically “external,” and “the primary unit of analysis was the
industry or competing groups of firms, rather than either the individual firm or the
economywide aggregate of enterprises (1968: vii). The central tenet of this
paradigm, as summarized by Porter (1981), is that a firm’s performance is
primarily a function of the industry environment in which it competes; and
because structure determines conduct (or conduct is simply a reflection of the
industry environment), which in turn determines performance, conduct can be
ignored and performance can, therefore, be explained by structure. Recent re-
search, in fact, supports this argument, but also suggests that the industry envi-
ronment has differential effects on large and small firms (Dean, Brown, &
Bamford, 1998). We explore these differences in a later section. Hence, the
adoption of the S-C-P paradigm in strategic management naturally shifted the
research focus from the firm to market structure.
Competitive dynamics (multipoint competition and competitive action-reac-
tion), an increasingly popular research area in the current field of strategic
management, also evolved partly from IO economics. This stream of research
often draws heavily on works by IO economists, such as Edwards (1955) and
Berheim and Whinston (1990) who introduced important concepts such as “mu-
tual forbearance” and “spheres of influence,” as well as game theoretical argu-
ments (e.g., Camerer & Weigelt, 1988; see Grimm & Smith, 1997 for a review of
these arguments).
In summary, this swing of the pendulum from early development of the field
to IO economics had a major effect on the field in terms of both theory and
method.
Early Intermediate Theories
Structure-conduct-performance framework. Porter (1980, 1985) made the
most influential contribution to the field employing IO economics logic. Using a
structural analysis approach, Porter (1980) outlines an analytical framework that
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can be used in understanding the structure of an industry. Structural analysis
focuses on competition beyond a firm’s immediate and existing rivals. Whereas
the concept of industry structure remains relatively unclear in the field of IO
economics, Porter’s (1980) Five Forces Model, by more clearly specifying the
various aspects of an industry structure, provides a useful analytic tool to assess
an industry’s attractiveness and facilitates competitor analysis. The ability for a
firm to gain competitive advantage, according to Porter (1980, 1985, 1996), rests
mainly on how well it positions and differentiates itself in an industry. The
collective effects of the five forces determine the ability of firms in an industry to
make profits. To Porter (1980, 1985), the five forces embody the rules of
competition that determine industry attractiveness, and help determine a compet-
itive strategy to “cope with and, ideally, to change those rules in the firm’s favor”
(1985: 4). Therefore, as a refinement of the traditional S-C-P paradigm, and also
a significant contribution to the field of strategic management, Porter’s framework
specifies the competitive structure of an industry in a more tangible manner, as
well as recognizes (albeit limitedly) the role of firms in formulating appropriate
competitive strategy to achieve superior performance. Porter (1980, 1985) sug-
gested generic strategies (low cost leadership, differentiation, and focus) that can
be used to match particular industry foci and, thereby, build competitive advan-
tage.
Strategic groups. Building on the IO economics perspective, strategy
researchers also developed the concept of “strategic groups.” In his study of the
white goods industry, Hunt (1972) first introduced strategic groups as an analytic
concept. To date, although there has yet to be a universal definition of strategic
groups in the literature, it is commonly defined as a group of firms in the same
industry following the same or similar strategies (Porter, 1980: 129). This line of
research disagrees with IO economics’ assumption that an industry’s members
differ only in market share and, hence, suggests that the presence of strategic
groups in an industry poses a significant effect on the industry’s performance
(Newman, 1978). The concept of strategic groups is closely linked to mobility
barriers (Caves & Porter, 1977), which insulate firms in a strategic group from
entry by members of another group through means such as scale economies,
product differentiation, or distribution network. Mobility barriers represent crucial
factors, in addition to industry-wide factors, in accounting for intra-industry
differences in firm performance (Caves & Porter, 1977; Porter, 1979). In this
regard, industry is no longer viewed as a homogeneous unit to the extent that the
concept of strategic groups exposes the “structure within industries” (Porter,
1979).
Although Hunt, Newman, and Porter’s research on strategic groups purports
to explain firm performance, the focus is actually on groups, rather than on firms.
For example, Newman’s (1973) study is on 34 “producer goods” industries that
are all related to chemical processes, while Porter’s (1973) focus is on 38
“consumer goods” industries. A series of studies conducted in the context of the
brewing industry by Hatten (1974), Hatten and Schendel (1977), and Hatten,
Schendel, and Cooper (1978) attempt to move the study of strategic groups to the
firm level by emphasizing firm heterogeneity and conduct (strategy). As a result,
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these studies focus on strategic groups within one industry. In addition to using
structural variables such as firm size and industry concentration ratio, these
brewing studies employ manufacturing (e.g., capital intensity of plants), market-
ing (e.g., number of brands), and financial (leverage) variables, among others, as
the basis for strategic group formation. Firm profitability is regarded as a function
of both industry structure and strategic conduct (Cool & Schendel, 1987; Hatten
& Schendel, 1977), thereby placing the IO economics strategic groups research
squarely in strategic management.
However, despite the large number of studies on strategic groups, this stream
of research faces some critical issues. Barney and Hoskisson (1990) challenged
two untested assertions in strategic groups theory: (1) whether strategic groups
exist; and (2) whether a firm’s performance depends on strategic group member-
ship. They argued that the existence of strategic groups in an industry rests on the
researcher’s presumption that strategic groups actually exist. Indeed, the resulting
groupings may be merely statistical artifacts of the cluster analytic procedures
used to create groups. To date, the concept of strategic groups lacks theoretical
support. Furthermore, the relationship between group membership and firm per-
formance depends critically on the existence of mobility barriers. To the extent
that mobility barriers exist in an industry, there is no theory to define them in a
particular industry. The attributes used for clustering strategic groups are consid-
ered mobility barriers if firm performance is different among the strategic groups.
Nonetheless, Barney and Hoskisson (1990) show that different clusters of the
same set of firms can produce significant differences in firm performance by
group. Based on these two limitations, Barney and Hoskisson (1990) raise doubt
about the contribution of strategic groups research to the field of strategic
management. The concept of strategic groups, developed largely as a theoretical
compromise between IO economics and strategic management, may lack theo-
retical validity. Recently, Wiggins and Ruefli (1995) found that stability of
performance group membership is lacking, questioning the efficacy of mobility
barriers and, thus, the predictive validity of strategic groups. The fundamental
question is whether firms are acutely aware of their mutual dependence within
their particular strategic groups (Porter, 1979), or are these groups an analytic
convenience employed by researchers (Hatten & Hatten, 1987).
Recent developments in the strategic groups research points toward several
perspectives. First, the dynamic characteristics of strategic groups have been
examined (e.g., Mascarenhas, 1989; Oster, 1982). This line of research found
initial evidence that there is a low level of firm movement across strategic groups.
Through an in-depth longitudinal study of the U.S. insurance industry, Fiegen-
baum and Thomas (1995) expanded this line of research by focusing on the
influence of strategic groups as a reference point for firm-level competitive
strategy decisions. Another recent development in strategic group research is
based on a cognitive perspective. Instead of using secondary data, Reger and Huff
(1993) rely on managers’ cognitive classifications to categorize strategic groups.
In a related vein, Porac, Thomas, Wilson, Paton, and Kanfer (1995) also use
managers’ cognitive perceptions to examine how firms define a reference group of
rivals. More recently, Peteraf and Shanley (1997) advance cognitive strategic
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group research by proposing a theory of strategic group identity and distinguish
between groups with strong identities from those with weak identities.
Similar to the research on strategic groups, organizational ecologists recently
have emphasized an evolutionary perspective in which the population of strate-
gically similar organizations are studied longitudinally, considering both their
success and failure (Barnett & Burgelman, 1996). Such research can account for
dynamics in the relationships among firms. This approach allows the examination
of how strategic outcomes develop. Thus, the theory developed predicts patterns
of change, rates of change and alternative paths of change (Barnett & Burgelman,
1996). Additionally, an evolutionary perspective assumes potential variation in
strategies that firms pursue over time. In particular, based on the ecological
perspective, an evolutionary approach examines how selection processes affect,
and are affected by, the type and rate of strategic change (Barnett & Burgelman,
1996). Recent empirical foci of the evolutionary approach include the evolution
of technological capabilities (Stuart & Podolny, 1996) and the iterated processes
of resource allocation (Noda & Bower, 1996). Scholars adopting this evolutionary
perspective argue that it is not based on a single theory. Rather, it synthesizes
many theoretical perspectives, such as economic efficiency, market power, orga-
nizational learning, structural inertia, transaction costs and others (Barnett &
Burgelman, 1996). They claim it provides an integrative framework in which firm
success and failure can be understood (Schendel, 1996).
Competitive dynamics. While strategic group studies represented the first
swing away from industry level research, another research stream, competitive
dynamics, further emphasizes the firm level in strategic management research.
The essence of this stream is an explicit recognition that a firm’s strategies are
dynamic: Actions initiated by one firm may trigger a series of actions among the
competing firms. The new competitive landscape in many industries, as described
by Bettis and Hitt (1995), gives rise to relentless pace of competition, emphasiz-
ing flexibility, speed, and innovation in response to the fast-changing environ-
ment. D’Aveni (1994) coined the term “hypercompetition” to describe the con-
dition of rapidly escalating competition characterizing many industries. The
increase in competitive dynamics research signifies strategy researchers’ acute
awareness of the new competitive landscape in the environment. There are several
areas that can be categorized as competitive dynamics research, all of which are
characterized by an explicit concern for the dynamic nature of business compe-
tition. These different areas are individually known as multi-point (or multi-
market) competition and competitive action-reaction.
The development of multi-point competition traces its primary theoretical
origin to IO economics (mainly oligopoly theory). There are content areas in the
IO economics literature concerned with competition across multiple markets
(Gimeno, 1994), to include strategic groups (e.g., Greening, 1979; Newman,
1973, 1978), mutual forbearance (e.g., Edwards, 1955; Bernheim & Whinston,
1990), and product-line rivalry (e.g., Brander & Eaton, 1984; Bulow, Geanako-
plos, & Klemperer, 1985). While these three content areas focus on different
mechanisms, the central prediction is that tacit collusion produces rivalry reduc-
tion and is more likely among firms sharing similar product-market scope because
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each of them realizes that intense rivalry will harm their individual performance.
Porter (1980, 1985) and Karnani and Wernerfelt (1985) pioneered the concept of
multi-point competition in the strategy literature. Illustrated with cases in the
roasted coffee industry and the heavy machinery industry, Porter (1980) discussed
the analysis of “cross-parry” conditions where a firm reacts to a move of a
competitor by counterattacking another market of that competitor. Also relying on
an inductive case study, Karnani and Wernerfelt (1985) developed two concepts,
“counterattack” and “mutual foothold equilibrium,” in their framework of multi-
market competition that emphasizes the role of multi-market retaliation.
Large-scale econometric studies on multi-market competition have begun to
appear in the strategy literature for the last several years. Using data on more than
3,000 city-pair markets in the U.S. airline industry, Gimeno and Woo (1996)
examined the simultaneous role of strategic similarity and multi-market contact in
competitive de-escalation. They found that strategic similarity moderately in-
creases the intensity of rivalry, while multi-market contact strongly reduces it.
Although prior literature found that strategic similarity reduces rivalry, the effect
of strategic similarity on rivalry may be biased if multi-market contact is not
appropriately controlled. Boeker, Goodstein, Stephan, and Murmann (1997),
using a sample of hospitals located in California, found that the extent to which
competitors compete in similar markets has a negative effect on market exit,
providing additional evidence that market overlap results in decreases rivalry.
Baum and Korn (1996) examined how market domain overlap and multi-market
contact influence market entry and exit. In the context of the California commuter
airline market, they found that market domain overlap increases the rates of
market entry and exit, whereas increases in multi-market contact reduce them.
This line of research provides new insight suggesting that close competitors are
often not the most intense rivals, thus challenging the traditional assumption of
firm rivalry.
Another line of research that has also drawn increasing attention is compet-
itor action-reaction studies (see Grimm & Smith, 1997, for a review of this work).
In a series of studies using detailed data on competitive moves in the U.S. airline
industry (e.g., Chen & MacMillan, 1992; Chen & Miller, 1994; Smith, Grimm,
Chen, & Gannon, 1989), the dynamics of how firms compete with one another and
how they make use of strategies to build competitive advantages over competitors
have been examined (Grimm & Smith, 1997; Smith, Grimm, & Gannon, 1992).
Two factors characterize this line of research. First, a variety of theoretical
frameworks have been employed. For instance, Smith, Grimm, Gannon, and Chen
(1991) used an organizational information processing model to explain the type of
action to which a firm is responding and the capabilities of the responding firm.
Chen and MacMillan (1992) employed a game theoretic framework to study the
effects of competitor dependence and action irreversibility on the characteristics
of a firm’s response to competitive moves. Adapting the expectancy-valence
theory from the psychology literature, Chen and Miller (1994) investigated how
competitive attacks can best minimize the chances of retaliation. Second, not only
do these studies demonstrate a strong research focus on firm-level competition,
but the unit of analysis is “action-reaction,” which can best depict the character-
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istic of dynamic competition (Smith, Grimm, & Gannon, 1992). Collectively,
these studies generate new thinking about business competition, one that expli-
cates the interactive, dynamic nature of firm competition.
More recently, Chen (1996) synthesized two crucial subjects in competitive
dynamics: competitor analysis and interfirm rivalry. Drawing on different theo-
ries, Chen (1996) introduced two firm-specific concepts: market commonality
(from multi-market competition) and resource similarity (from the resource-based
view) to help elucidate the pre-battle competitive tension between two firms and
to predict how firms may interact with each other as competitors. Chen’s approach
demonstrates the fruitfulness of integrating Porter’s IO based approach (“outside-
in”) and the resource based approach (“inside-out”) for understanding interfirm
competition. Besides, unlike that of Porter’s (1980) Five Forces Framework that
focuses on the industry level, analysis in Chen’s (1996) model focuses on the firm,
emphasizing a dyadic, pair-wise analysis, yielding significant insights for com-
petitive dynamics research.
The influence of the S-C-P paradigm has been enormous (Rumelt et al.,
1994). From a firm-level analysis where identification of the “best practices” was
considered the goal, much research in the field suddenly embraced the crucial
importance of industry structure and its effects: strategy and performance. Al-
though Porter’s influence on the field is widely regarded as substantial (Porter,
1998a), his view about the significance of the industry is not without critics.
Rumelt (1991) argued that interfirm heterogeneity within industries (business
specific effects) explains firm economic performance much more than industry
membership. Roquebert, Phillips, and Westfall (1996), using a different database,
also support this finding. In a recent paper, Porter (1996) reaffirmed the crucial
significance of strategic positioning in business competition. A recent study by
McGahan and Porter (1997), with a sample including service sectors, found that
(1) industry represents an important factor in affecting firm economic perfor-
mance, and more specifically, (2) industry effects are more important in account-
ing for firm performance in service industry than in manufacturing industry.
Although a lot has been learned about performance determination over the years,
it appears much remains unanswered for strategy researchers.
Despite the effect of the S-C-P paradigm on the field of strategic manage-
ment, the shift from the industry level to the firm level began gradually with the
focus on strategic groups. The original conception of strategic groups was focused
primarily on the industry level (e.g., Newman, 1978; Porter, 1979), but develop-
ment of the concept by strategy researchers has been predominantly concerned
with firm strategy within an industry (e.g., Purdue University’s brewing industry
studies). Interestingly, strategic groups research represents the first swing in the
field back toward the firm level.
The ability of strategy research to internalize and develop diverse theories to
study a variety of topics perhaps has enabled the field to experience exceptional
development in its short history. Besides strategic groups discussed above, re-
search on competitive dynamics clearly demonstrates the field’s ability to inte-
grate economics based arguments with management theories and concepts, such
as information processing, expectancy-valence theory, to create a unique body of
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research with a strong focus on the firm and competitive interaction. Therefore,
although strategic management in this period was heavily influenced by econom-
ics, researchers were able to develop new, unique theories for the field.
Early Intermediate Methodologies
Tremendous changes in the methodology of strategic management research
occurred during this period. Schendel and Hatten strongly advocated that strategic
management needed empirical research to show relationships between variables
as “the conceptual development of the field has outstripped the research derived
evidence available to support, deny or modify it” (1972: 101). Furthermore, they
pointed out the need for strategy research to go beyond the inductive approach and
conduct more deductive studies with “reliable data specifically collected to allow
the development of testable answers to strategic questions” (1972: 102). Schendel
and Hatten (1972) suggested that it was necessary for the field to build models,
perform analyses, and develop theories. A landmark event that served to define
the development of the field was a conference held in 1979 at the University of
Pittsburgh organized by Dan Schendel and Charles Hofer. The purpose of the
conference was threefold: (1) to describe and define the field of strategic man-
agement; (2) to critically examine the research methodologies and data sources
presently in use; and (3) to suggest fruitful future directions (Schendel & Hofer,
1979: vi). The push toward the new “strategic management” paradigm, and
movement away from the more traditional “business policy” paradigm, was,
therefore, markedly evident during this time. The adoption of the name “strategic
management” signified the field’s move towards a new paradigm, to become a
more “scientific,” empirically oriented research discipline (Schendel & Hofer,
1979). Interest in theory building and research methodology began to proliferate
among strategy researchers, as evidenced by the growing popularity of Robert
Dubin’s (1969) book, Theory Building.
Although normative, inductive case-based studies had dominated the early
history of strategic management, positivistic, deductive empirical research be-
came dominant during this period. Therefore, concern with explanation and
prediction, rather than prescription, was strongly advocated by strategy scholars
with the aim to elevate the field to a more rigorous, “scientific” academic
discipline.
In this regard, IO economics has had an important effect on strategy research
beyond theoretical influence, by encouraging strategy researchers to adopt the
methodologies used in economics. Porter (1981: 617) holds that because IO
economics research has developed “a strong empirical tradition built around the
statistical analysis of populations of firms and industries,” research on strategy
would be able to supplement the more traditional case study with statistical
methods. IO economics, as a sub-field of economics, utilizes the methodological
framework of positive economics. In Essays in Positive Economics, Milton
Friedman (1953) describes positive economics, unlike normative economics, as
“in principle independent of any particular ethical or normative prescriptions,”
whereas “Its task is to provide a system of generalizations that can be used to
make predictions about the consequences of any change in circumstances,” and
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“Its performance is to be judged by the precision, scope, and conformity with
experience of the predictions it yields” (1953: 4). In this regard, economics
appears to bear substantial influence on both the theoretical, as well as method-
ological frameworks of strategic management, as it changed to become a more
“scientific” and hence, more “respectable,” academic discipline.
Concomitantly, the availability of commercial databases such as PIMS and
COMPUSTAT provided strategic management researchers with convenient ac-
cess to a large amount of firm level data. Moreover, researchers have also
expended significant effort to construct data sets by means of large-scale surveys
or detailed archival sources. Although the sample size in most studies was usually
less than one hundred in the earlier period, a typical study now has at least
hundreds of observations to as large as tens of thousands of observations (e.g.,
Chen & MacMillan, 1992; Gimeno & Woo, 1996). The use of more advanced
statistics with the availability of statistical software packages and computers also
enabled the use of large data sets. The increasing attention to the methodological
issues helped to advance the research rigor in the strategic management field. For
example, the early advocates of a more scientific approach to strategy research
also introduced multivariate statistical analyses in their studies and emphasized
the use of appropriate methods (e.g., Hatten, 1974; Hatten & Schendel, 1977;
Patton, 1976). The use of increasingly sophisticated methods in the field has been
impressive [e.g., Gimeno & Woo’s (1996) use of panel data analysis; Keats &
Hitt’s (1988) use of a causal modeling approach with time-ordered data; Chen &
MacMillan’s (1992) use of logistic regression], signifying the ability and will-
ingness of strategic management researchers to advance the field.
While IO economics emphasizes industry-level phenomena, strategic man-
agement is concerned with firm-level strategies. Application of the IO paradigms
brought new and important foci to the strategic management field. However,
building on the early work of Ansoff and others, there remained some missing
pieces of the puzzle. Research has shown that some firms perform better than
others in the same industry and/or within the same strategic group. This suggests
firm-level phenomena are important. Furthermore, the competitive landscape for
many industries began to change, particularly with the development of global
markets (as opposed to domestic markets) (Hitt, Keats, & DeMarie, 1998).
Foreign firms entered domestic markets and, in some cases, armed with new ideas
and strategies, began to capture significant market shares. Thus, strategic man-
agement scholars retrained their focus on the firm.
A Swing Back Toward the Firm: Organizational Economics
Unlike classical microeconomics that treats the firm as a production function
(or “black box”), organizational economics is a sub-field of the economics
discipline that ventures into the black box to unravel its inner structural logic and
functioning. This primary interest in the “organization” (or the “firm”) creates a
strong affinity with strategic management. Two branches of organizational eco-
nomics largely developed in the mid-1970s have since generated the most interest
(and controversies) and studies in strategic management: transaction costs eco-
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nomics (Williamson, 1975, 1985) and agency theory (Fama, 1980; Jensen &
Meckling, 1976). TCE and agency theory’s focus on the “firm” helps swing the
strategic management pendulum further away from the industry level emphasis of
the S-C-P paradigm and toward a firm level of analysis (see Figure 1).
TCE is largely built on Coase’s (1937) critical insight on transaction costs as
contained in his seminal article “The Nature of the Firm.” Coase (1937) posited
that organizations exist because the cost of managing economic exchanges be-
tween firms (transaction costs) is sometimes greater than that of managing
exchanges within firms. To a lesser extent, agency theory draws on Coase’s
(1937) transaction costs concept, as well. However, the insight of Berle and
Means (1932) on separation of ownership and control in modern U.S. corpora-
tions and the subsequent work on property rights (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972)
provided additional important building blocks for agency theory.
Continued rigorous development in organizational economics has provided
important tools for strategic management researchers during this stage of the
field’s development. TCE and agency arguments have been applied in strategic
management research in several substantive areas.
Intermediate Theories
Transaction costs economics. Williamson’s (1975, 1985) formulation of
transaction costs economics (TCE) seeks to explain why organizations exist. The
basic premise of TCE is that markets and hierarchies are alternative governance
mechanisms for completing transactions. To the extent that the price system fails
to provide accurate and reliable market signals, hierarchies become a superior
mechanism over arms-length market transactions. In the TCE framework, the unit
of analysis is the firm-level dyadic transaction, wherein minimization of transac-
tion costs is the efficient outcome. TCE logic is premised on a set of assumptions
about human behavior and attributes of transactions that affect transactions
between two firms: bounded rationality (developed by Simon, 1945), opportun-
ism, uncertainty, small numbers, and asset specificity (Williamson, 1975, 1985).
As a departure from IO economics research that is largely focused on industry
structure that affects firm behaviors and performance, TCE-based research is built
on the assumptions of human (or managerial) behaviors and attributes of trans-
actions that affect modes of transaction (e.g., market versus hierarchy) and
outcomes. Despite controversies around these assumptions [for example, see the
debate between Donaldson (1990) and Barney (1991) or Hill’s (1990) criticism on
opportunism], strategic management researchers have applied transaction costs
logic to examine a number of substantive topics [e.g., multidivisional form
(M-form), hybrid forms of organization, and international strategy] to provide
significant insights for the field.
The study of the M-form structure has a long tradition in the field of strategy
that dates back to Chandler’s (1962) seminal work. Among strategic management
researchers, Williamson’s TCE provides the predominant theoretical rationale to
explain the increasing and wide adoption of M-form. A majority of empirical
studies in the strategic management have found some evidence that the M-form is
generally associated with higher performance (e.g., Hill, 1985; Hoskisson &
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Galbraith, 1985; Hoskisson, 1987; Hoskisson, Harrison, & Dubofsky, 1991).
More recently, strategy researchers have provided an important clarification
regarding the link between M-form and performance by pointing out that M-form
efficiency is dependent on internal contingencies (Hill & Hoskisson, 1987; Hill,
Hitt, & Hoskisson, 1992; Hoskisson & Johnson, 1992). These researchers suggest
that different types of transaction costs efficiency are related to different strategies
(vertical integration, related and unrelated diversification). For instance, related
diversification is associated with the economies of scope benefits, whereas unre-
lated diversification chiefly benefits from financial economies of the internal
capital market. More specifically, Hill et al. (1992) further specify the structures,
whereby these kinds of benefits can be achieved. To enjoy the benefits from
vertical integration or related diversification, an internal cooperative structure is
needed; on the other hand, to capture the benefits from unrelated diversification,
an internal competitive structure is required. Hoskisson, Hill, and Kim (1993)
have comprehensively reviewed M-form research in strategic management.
Another topic where TCE is fruitfully applied is the hybrid form of organi-
zation. “Hybrids” refer to the various organizing modes between the two polarities
of markets and hierarchies, such as joint ventures, franchising, and licensing. With
the recent increase in hybrid forms of organization, Williamson (1991) attempted
to incorporate the hybrid forms into his framework as special cases along the
continuum of markets and hierarchies. Kogut (1988) posits that there are two
internal conditions that characterize a joint venture: joint ownership (and control)
and mutual commitment of resources. Also, there are two situational character-
istics most appropriately suited for joint ventures: asset specificity and high
uncertainty in performance specification and monitoring. Joint ventures provide a
“mutual hostage position,” whereby uncertainty with regard to opportunistic
behaviors can be resolved. Consistent with TCE arguments, Hennart (1988: 364)
points out that joint ventures are “a device to bypass inefficient markets for
intermediate inputs” because the presence of intermediate market inefficiencies is
a necessary condition for the establishment of joint ventures.
Perhaps owing to the additional transactional concern in international oper-
ations, a substantial amount of recent empirical work applying TCE to strategic
management focuses on international market entry or involve an international
context [e.g., Hennart & Park’s (1993, 1994) studies on Japanese entries in the
United States and Dyer’s (1996, 1997) studies comparing Japanese and U.S.
automotive manufacturers]. Together with internalization theory that also uses
transaction costs logic, and was independently developed by a group of interna-
tional business researchers (e.g., Buckley & Casson, 1981; Rugman, 1981), the
use of TCE has substantially increased our understanding of the choice of
international modes of entry or operations (e.g., Hill & Kim, 1988).
Agency theory. Agency theory, as developed in the financial economics
literature (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983), has attracted the
attention of many strategic management researchers leading to a large number of
studies over the last two decades. Primarily drawing on the property rights
literature (e.g., Alchian & Demsetz, 1972) and TCE, agency theory posits that due
to “separation of ownership and control” in modern corporations, there is often a
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divergence of interests between shareholders (principals) and managers (agents).
Agency theory assumes that human beings are boundedly rational, self-interested,
and opportunistic (Eisenhardt, 1989a), and therefore managers will seek to max-
imize their own interests even at the expense of the shareholders. According to
agency theory, a firm is a nexus of contracts and as such, the basic unit of analysis
in agency theory is the contract. Agency theory helps swing the pendulum back
further toward a firm level focus because it seeks to enter the “black box” to
examine causes and consequences of agency conflict between shareholders and
managers, and the effectiveness of various governance devices designed to
mitigate the conflict. Therefore, the theoretical concern of agency theory is more
at a firm level of analysis than TCE.
Strategy researchers have applied agency theory to a number of substantive
topics, including innovation, corporate governance, and diversification; and the
results are, in general, consistent with the prediction of agency theory. Because
managers’ firm-specific investments in human capital are not diversifiable, they
may have the incentive to pursue firm diversification, especially unrelated diver-
sification, in order to diversify their employment risk, so long as firm profitability
does not suffer too excessively (e.g., Hoskisson & Turk, 1990). Because firm size
and executive compensation are highly correlated (e.g., Tosi & Gomez-Meija,
1989), managers also have an additional incentive to increase the size of the firm
by diversification to obtain higher levels of personal compensation. Hoskisson and
Hitt’s (1990) review of diversification research provides a detailed discussion on
the relation between agency theory and diversification.
Internal governance mechanisms such as board composition (e.g., Baysinger
& Hoskisson, 1989; Baysinger, Kosnik, & Turk, 1991; Hill & Snell, 1988; Zahra
& Pearce, 1989), ownership structure (e.g., Bethel & Liebeskind, 1993; Hill &
Snell, 1988; Hoskisson & Turk, 1990; Kosnik, 1990) and executive compensation
(e.g., Gomez-Meija, 1994; Hoskisson, Hitt, Turk, & Tyler, 1989; Tosi & Gomez-
Meija, 1989) may be used to help align the interests between shareholders and
managers. External governance devices, such as the market for the corporate
control, become more relevant (active) when internal governance devices are
unable to mitigate agency costs (Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 1993; Walsh &
Kosnik, 1993; Walsh & Seward, 1990). However, there is no perfect governance
mechanism that fully eliminates agency conflicts. Tradeoffs may influence a
firm’s level and type of diversification (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1989). Moreover,
managers are able to devise means to reduce the effectiveness of governance
devices. For instance, the adoption of anti-takeover amendments, such as poison
pills (e.g., Mallette & Fowler, 1992; Sundaramurthy, 1996), can reduce the threat
of the market for corporate control.
Agency conflicts may also affect corporate innovation. Investments in R&D
create higher levels of risk for the managers; consequently, risk-averse managers
are reluctant to engage in innovative activities, which, in turn, results in loss of
competitiveness and lower performance (Hoskisson, Hitt, & Hill, 1993).
Baysinger and Hoskisson (1989) found a negative relationship between diversi-
fication strategy and R&D investment. As a further support of the argument that
firm innovation is affected by managerial opportunism, Kochhar and David
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(1996) found that institutional ownership (as a governance device) is positively
related to firm innovation. Thus, institutional owners ensure that managers make
proper investments in innovation to maintain the firm’s competitiveness.
Instead of industry structure variables, such as market concentration or scale
economies that determine firm behaviors and performance as postulated by IO
based research, the principal drivers of firm strategy and performance in organi-
zational economics are managerial motives (opportunism) and capabilities
(bounded rationality), information asymmetry, contracts enforcement, perfor-
mance evaluation, and the transaction relationship between two parties (firms in
TCE and principal and agent in agency theory). Thus, the main concerns of
strategic management research based on organizational economics are vastly
different from those based on IO economics. Gradually, strategy research was
moving back to the direction of examining how the firms’ internal mechanisms
and attributes influence firm strategy and performance.
Intermediate Methodologies
Microeconomics has been driven by a concern for refining its internal logic
and has become increasingly more mathematically oriented. Although strategic
management has striven to attain rigorous scientific standards, its study domain
has to be relevant to actual business operations. In this regard, strategic manage-
ment researchers during this period were attracted to organizational economics
because it focused on institutional details and human (managerial) action as
opposed to mathematical displays (Rumelt et al., 1994). This choice is exempli-
fied by strategic management researchers adoption of positivist agency theory
(e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 1976), instead of the more mathematical, normative
principal-agent theory.
Nevertheless, research based on either TCE or agency theory encounters the
problem of unobservables (Godfrey & Hill, 1995), which presents significant
challenges for empirical research. As Godfrey and Hill (1995) contend, some of
the key variables in organizational economics, such as opportunism and the
degree of divergent interests, obviously suffer from measurement unobservability.
Reviewing the literature on the relationship between agency motives and diver-
sification, Hoskisson and Hitt (1990), also note that research in this area has been
limited because (1) managers are unlikely to admit that agency motives are
present in decision-making, and (2) unambiguous indicators of the effects of
governance mechanisms on firm behaviors are difficult to isolate. Consequently,
researchers have to rely on “more speculative theory and indirect research on
governance structure mechanism,” such as ownership structure and executive
compensation (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990). Such methodological problems pose
significant challenges to strategic management researchers and also create con-
troversy among researchers holding different assumptions about the nature of
human motives (an excellent example is the debate regarding TCE between
Ghoshal & Moran, 1996, Williamson, 1996, and Moran & Ghoshal, 1996).
There was increasing adoption of sophisticated research methods during this
period. For instance, the application of structural equation modeling in strategic
management studies has become increasingly common, as exemplified in work by
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Hoskisson, Johnson, and Moesel (1994) and Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson, and Moe-
sel (1996). The growing availability of large databases, as well as researchers’
effort in collecting data from other archival sources and large-scale surveys, have
contributed to the increasing level of methodological sophistication used in
strategic management research.
While transaction costs theory and agency theory contributed substantially to
our understanding of strategic management, there were still missing pieces of the
puzzle. Some argued that there were idiosyncratic characteristics of firms that
contributed to their competitive advantage (e.g., Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984).
For example, some firms more effectively manage transaction costs, while others
are able to respond to competitors’ actions more effectively than others. The
heterogeneity among firms in the same industry (or strategic group), then, is of
importance. The primary differentiation of firms is in their resources, tangible and
intangible. The importance of resources, however, was not a new concept. As
Penrose (1959) argued, firms were collections of productive resources, and the
heterogeneity of resources provides firms with their unique characters. Thus, the
field was coming full circle, back to its roots with a renewed focus on firms’
idiosyncratic resources. Importantly, the renewed focus on resources was coupled
with scholarly work integrating the environmental characteristics (IO economics)
and firm specific resources to examine and understand strategic management (i.e.,
Dess, Gupta, Hennart, & Hill, 1995). The integration of these views is exemplified
in Grimm and Smith’s (1997) action-based model of organizational evolution.
Next, we examine the renewed emphasis on idiosyncratic firm resources.
Back Toward the Starting Point: The Resource-Based View
Recently, the popularity of the resource-based view of the firm has once
again returned our focus inside the black box of the firm (see Figure 1). The
significance of the RBV was recognized when Birger Wernerfelt’s (1984) “A
Resource-based View of the Firm” was selected as the best 1994 paper published
in the Strategic Management Journal. The RBV emerged as “an important new
conceptualization in the field of strategic management” and is “one of the most
important redirections of the (content of) strategy research in this decade” (Zajac,
1995: 169). Theoretically, the central premise of RBV addresses the fundamental
question of why firms are different and how firms achieve and sustain competitive
advantage. Research sub-streams also focus on specific types of resources inside
a firm, such as strategic leadership and tacit knowledge. Methodologically, the
RBV also has helped the field reintroduce inductive, case-based methods focused
on a single or a few firms into the research to complement deductive, large-sample
methods. In this section, we trace how the pendulum is swinging back to the
starting point.
Current Theories
Resource-based view of the firm. The resource-based view of the firm is
not new. Its footprints can be found in early management works. The relationship
between a firm’s special competencies (deploying its resources) and firm perfor-
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mance was embedded in some classic management treatises. For instance, Sel-
znick’s (1957) idea of an organization’s “distinctive competence” is directly
related to the RBV. Also, Chandler’s (1962) notion of “structure follows strate-
gy,” as well as Andrew’s (1971) proposal of “an internal appraisal of strengths
and weaknesses, led to identification of distinctive competencies.” Additionally,
Ansoff’s (1965) definition of synergy as “one internally generated by a combi-
nation of capabilities or competencies” is related to the RBV.
However, the founding idea of viewing a firm as a bundle of resources was
pioneered in 1959 by Penrose in her theory of the growth of the firm. Penrose
viewed the firm as a collection of productive resources—“[A] firm is more than
an administrative unit; it is also a collection of productive resources the disposal
of which between different uses and over time is determined by administrative
decision” (1959: 24). And she defined resources as “the physical things a firm
buys, leases, or produces for its own use, and the people hired on terms that make
them effectively part of the firm” (1959: 67). Penrose argued that it is the
heterogeneity, not the homogeneity, of the productive services available or
potentially available from its resources that gives each firm its unique character.
The notion that firms attain a unique character by virtue of their heterogeneous
resources is the basis of RBV. Penrose also related the interaction between
material and human resources to firm performance. Such a resource-performance
linkage is a salient issue in strategic management.
Since the early 1980s, researchers have been developing and defining re-
source-based concepts, and seeking to relate how resources can give rise to firm
competitive advantage. Wernerfelt (1984) suggested that evaluating firms in terms
of their resources can lead to insights that differ from the traditional perspective.
A firm’s resources are defined as tangible and intangible assets which are tied
semi-permanently to the firm. In an analogy to entry barriers, Wernerfelt exam-
ined the relationship between resources and profitability in terms of resource
position barriers, proposing that a first mover advantage is an attractive resource
that should yield high returns in markets where the resource in question domi-
nates. Moreover, in an analogy to the growth-share matrix, a resource-product
matrix was used as a way to examine the balance between the exploitation of
existing resources and the development of new ones. Though Wernerfelt’s (1984)
article was rather abstract, it opened a new ground for later researchers on which
to build (Wernerfelt, 1995).
Extending Wernerfelt’s (1984) work, researchers attempted to explain more
specifically how differences in firms’ resources realized superior firm perfor-
mance. Based on the assumption of resource heterogeneity, Rumelt (1984) ex-
plained that firms may start as homogeneous, but with “isolating mechanisms,”
they become differentiated such that their resources cannot be perfectly imitated.
Barney (1986a) suggested that resource factors differ in their “tradeability,” where
a tradeable factor is one that can be specifically identified and its monetary value
determined via a “strategic factor market.” Dierickx and Cool (1989) suggested
that resources can be differentiated as either asset flows or asset stocks. They
explained economic rent sustainability in terms of resources with limited strategic
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substitutability by equivalent assets and time compression diseconomies for firms
trying to imitate resources of another firm.
Another group of researchers focused on examining specific resources which
give rise to sustainable competitive advantages. The resources they examined
included: response lags (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982), routines (Nelson & Winter,
1982), functionally based distinctive competencies (Hitt & Ireland, 1985, 1986;
Hitt, Ireland, & Palia, 1982; Hitt, Ireland, & Stadter, 1982; Snow & Hrebiniak,
1980), unique combination of business experience (Huff, 1982; Prahalad & Bettis,
1986; Spender, 1989), organizational culture (Barney, 1986b; Fiol, 1991), invis-
ible assets that by their nature are difficult to imitate (Itami, 1987), organizational
learning (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997), entrepreneurship (Nelson, 1991;
Rumelt, 1987), and human resources (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993), among others.
In 1991, Barney presented a more concrete and comprehensive framework to
identify the needed characteristics of firm resources in order to generate sustain-
able competitive advantages (Barney, 1991). Four criteria were proposed to assess
the economic implications of the resources: value, rareness, inimitability, and
substitutability. Value refers to the extent to which the firm’s combination of
resources fits with the external environment so that the firm is able to exploit
opportunities and/or neutralize threats in the competitive environment. Rareness
refers to the physical or perceived physical rareness of the resources in the factor
markets. Inimitability is the continuation of imperfect factor markets via infor-
mation asymmetry such that resources cannot be obtained or recreated by other
firms without a cost disadvantage. Finally, the framework also considers whether
the organizations are substitutable by competitors.
One of the criticisms of Barney’s framework is that it does not account for
bundles of resources; the framework treats resources as singularly distinct factors
(Black & Boal, 1994). To remedy this, some researchers proposed that resources
are nested by factor networks that have specific interrelationships (e.g., Black &
Boal, 1994; Grant, 1991) and that there is a need to examine the dynamic
interrelationships among the resources. Robins (1992) argued that these firm
specific relationships generate quasi-rents because the tradable factors have their
value bid away. Amit and Schoemaker (1993) expanded the framework in which
such value that included the sub-dimensions of an external link overlapping with
strategic industry factors and internal complementarity. Rareness was expanded to
include scarcity and low tradability. Inimitability was divided into inimitability
and limited substitutability. And organization configuration was specified as
appropriability and durability.
Recently, the research on RBV has become further specialized. First, rigid-
ities in acquiring resources may be different from the rigidities in shedding
resources (Montgomery, 1995), and some resources may have negative value by
creating core rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1992). Second, a controversy has
evolved concerning the potential of the RBV to be a theory of the firm. Conner
(1991) compared RBV to five fundamental approaches used in industrial organi-
zation economics: perfect competition model, Bain-type IO, the Schumpeterian
and Chicago Schools of economics, and transaction cost economics. Mahoney and
Pandian (1992) suggested the distinctiveness of the RBV compared to the orga-
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nizational economics paradigms, including evolutionary economics, transaction
cost economics, property rights theory, and positive agency theory. Both Conner
and Mahoney and Pandian concluded that RBV may form the kernel of a unifying
paradigm for strategic management research. RBV provides a framework for
increasing dialogue between scholars from different disciplines within the con-
versation of strategic management. This is demonstrated by Oliver (1997) who
tried to extend the boundary of the resource-based view of the firm to incorporate
the institutional perspective to explain variation in firm performance. Lastly,
sub-streams are emerging from the RBV, such as strategic leadership and the
knowledge-based view of the firm, as elaborated below.
Strategic leadership and strategic decision theory. A potentially unique
resource is a firm’s strategic leaders. As such, strategic leadership has developed
into a significant stream of strategic management research (Finkelstein & Ham-
brick, 1996). Strategic leadership research focuses on individuals (e.g., CEO or
division general managers), groups (e.g., top management teams) or other gov-
ernance bodies (e.g., board of directors).
Studying the role of top executives has been a historical topic of interest in
the management literature. Fayol (1949) proposed the major managerial actions as
planning, organizing, coordinating, commanding, and controlling. Barnard (1938)
and Selznick (1957) suggested that the top management job is to establish and
convey “organizational meaning” and maintain institutional integrity. In his book
The Nature of Managerial Work, Henry Mintzberg (1973) classified ten mana-
gerial roles into three categories: interpersonal, informational, and decisional.
Mintzberg’s general portrayal of managerial work was confirmed in later studies
(Kotter, 1982; Tsui, 1984). As proposed by March and Simon (1958), top
managers are embedded in a situation of ambiguity, complexity, and often
experience information overload. In such circumstances, the decision maker’s
personal frame of reference, experiences, education, functional background, and
other personal attributes have significant effects on their decisions and actions.
Thus, the multiplicity of top managers’ roles, as well as the “bounded rationality”
of these managers, served as a basis for research on the effects of strategic leaders
on the form and fate of their organizations.
Kotter’s (1982) The General Managers helped to foster a formal stream of
strategic leadership research. Kotter posited that differences in managers’ behav-
ior may be traceable to differences in their personal and background character-
istics. Shortly thereafter, Hambrick and Mason (1984) presented a more formal
theoretical framework based on the upper echelon perspective, proposing that
senior executives make strategic choices on the basis of their cognitions and
values. They argued that an organization becomes “a reflection of its top man-
agers.”
Following Hambrick and Mason, a substantial number of academic and
applied studies on top executives and their organizations were conducted. Em-
pirical evidence of strategic leaders’ effects on organizational outcomes is nu-
merous. Organizational performance was found to be associated with: executives’
past performance record (Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1986; Smith, Carson, & Alex-
ander, 1984), top management team size, composition, and tenure (Haleblian &
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Finkelstein, 1993; Murray, 1989; Smith et al., 1994). Apart from the direct effects
of strategic leaders on organizational performance, top management characteris-
tics were also found to be related to firm strategies and structures (Helmich &
Brown, 1972; Miller & Droge, 1986). These indirect effects implied that the
relationship between strategic leaders and organizational performance may de-
pend on some contingency factors.
Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) outlined the concept of “managerial dis-
cretion” which refers to the latitude of action and is a function of “(1) the degree
to which the environment allows variety and change, (2) the degree to which the
organization is amenable to an array of possible actions and empowers the chief
executive to formulate and execute those actions, and (3) the degree to which the
chief executive personally is able to envision or create multiple courses of action”
(p. 379). Empirical attempts were made to identify high- and low-discretion
industries (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; Ham-
brick & Abrahamson, 1995). Managerial discretion, which links the individual
characteristics of strategic leaders with organizational and environmental factors,
is believed to be a fruitful area for future strategic leadership research (Finkelstein
& Hambrick, 1996).
A primary catalyst for research on managerial discretion was John Child’s
(1972) work on strategic choice. Child, in effect, argued that managers had the
discretion to make strategic choices; firm outcomes were not largely dictated by
external environmental conditions. This led to debates of environmental deter-
minism versus strategic choice (e.g., Hitt & Tyler, 1991; Hrebiniak & Joyce,
1985). This research served as a catalyst to work on the fit between the environ-
ment and firm strategy (i.e., Miller & Friesen, 1984). It also spawned a more
behavioral or cognitive perspective of strategic decision making. This perspective
is exemplified in the work by Huff and others on cognitive mapping (e.g., Barr,
Stimpert, & Huff, 1992; Huff, 1990; Markoczy & Goldberg, 1995) and in the
work by Hitt and colleagues using policy capturing (e.g., Hitt, Dacin, Tyler, &
Park, 1997; Hitt & Tyler, 1991). Speed of strategic decision making has been
addressed by Eisenhardt (1989b).
Knowledge-based view of the firm. The knowledge-based view (KBV) of
the firm is an extension of the RBV by conceptualizing firms as heterogeneous,
knowledge-bearing entities. Viewing a firm from a knowledge-based perspective
was sparked by Michael Polanyi’s (1966) assertion, “We can know more than we
can tell” (p. 4). Polanyi classified knowledge into two categories: explicit or
codified knowledge which refers to knowledge that is transmittable in formal,
systematic language; and tacit knowledge which has a personal quality and, thus,
is difficult to formalize and communicate. Later, Zander and Kogut (1995)
operationalized the construct of knowledge into five dimensions: codifiablity,
teachability, complexity, system dependence, and product observability.
Building on Polanyi’s idea, Kogut and Zander (1992) presented a contrast
between the knowledge-based perspective and the contracting perspective. They
argued that the assumptions of selfishness are not a necessary premise for shirking
or dishonesty. Instead, they view firms as a repository of capabilities in which
individual and social expertise is transformed into economically valuable prod-
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ucts. They posit that “firms exist because they provide a social community of
voluntaristic action structured by organizing principles that are not reducible to
individuals” (p. 384). This means that by its tacitness and social complexity, a
firm’s stock of knowledge is an important determinant of its competitive advan-
tage. Such a conceptualization of firms as bearers of tacit, social, and path-
dependent organizational knowledge created a new paradigm relative to the
conceptualization of the contractual approaches (Foss, 1996).
Such a notion that “firms do better than market” (Kogut & Zander, 1992) is
supported by Nonaka (1994) who posited that “the theory of organizational
knowledge is a basic theory for building a truly ‘humanistic’ knowledge society
beyond the limitation of mere economic rationality” (p. 24). Conner and Prahalad
(1996) compared knowledge-based predictions of organizational modes with
opportunism-based ones. They argued that when opportunistic potential is too low
to justify a firm, a different mode of organizing is then selected according to the
knowledge-based perspective. While the opportunism-based approach anticipates
a firm, the KBV suggests whether a firm, joint venture, or market contracting will
be optimal. Kogut and Zander (1996) elaborated that the KBV has an economic
value over market transactions when identity leads to social knowledge that
supports coordination and communication. This suggests that the KBV is a
behavioral approach that predicts the superiority of firms over markets.
Research on the KBV is often process-oriented. For instance, Cohen and
Levinthal (1990) proposed a new perspective on learning and innovation. They
introduced a term “absorptive capacity” that refers to the ability of a firm to
recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate it, and apply it to
commercial ends. Absorptive capacity is dependent on a firm’s level of prior
related knowledge. As such, ease of learning is affected by the degree to which an
innovation is related to this pre-existing knowledge. Pisano (1994) also suggested
there is no one best way to learn, but different approaches may be required in
different knowledge environments. Nonaka (1994) focused on the knowledge
creation process. He explained that the interactive amplification of tacit and
explicit knowledge through socialization, combination, externalization, and inter-
nalization, knowledge held by individuals, organizations, and societies can be
enlarged and enriched simultaneously. As such, firms have capabilities, if used to
create knowledge which leads to commercial value, and such knowledge capa-
bilities are hard to duplicate. Finally, Lei, Hitt, and Bettis (1996) integrate the
RBV and KBV by arguing that core competencies only maintain value through
continuous development. They suggest that the dynamic qualities of competencies
are developed through meta-learning; that is, the capability to learn continuously.
Current Methodologies
Because the RBV emphasizes the idiosyncratic nature of a firm’s resources
and capabilities, empirical testing of the resource-based theory faces great chal-
lenges. Nonetheless, empirical research on this topic is beginning to develop.
Because valuable, rare and inimitable resources are usually intangible in
nature and intangible resources are more difficult to measure (Godfrey & Hill,
1995), RBV researchers have used proxies as measures of intangible constructs.
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For example, Kochhar, Hitt, and Bierman (1996) used human capital leverage as
a proxy for employee skills and capabilities, and the number of large corporations
from the top 250 firms that served as the clients of the law firms to proxy for firm’s
reputation. This measure was validated by a survey evaluating the reputation of
the top 100 law firms. In their study of movie studios, Miller and Shamsie (1996)
used former investments in complex, large-skill film projects as a proxy for the
complex set of team, coordinative and integrative knowledge-based resources.
However, as argued by Godfrey and Hill (1995), it is by construction impossible
to assess the degree of unobservability of an unobservable, and, by definition,
inimitable resources are unobservable. Therefore, unobservability poses a sub-
stantial measurement challenge to RBV researchers. Proxies may not be valid
measures for the underlying constructs.
To supplement the proxies of resource-based constructs, Henderson and
Cockburn (1994) used both quantitative questionnaires and qualitative interviews,
as well as multiple informants, to increase the validity and reliability of the
measures of organizational competence. In their study of the evolution of tech-
nological capabilities, Stuart and Podolyny (1996) developed a network-analytical
approach to quantify the evolution of firms’ technological positions. Such an
approach permits graphical and quantitative assessment of firms’ search behavior,
and enables firms to be positioned and grouped according to the similarities in
their innovative capabilities.
Both multi-industry studies (Markides & Williamson, 1994; Robins &
Wiersema, 1995) and single industry studies (Almeida, 1996; Kochhar et al.,
1996; Miller & Shamsie, 1996) of the resource-based view have been conducted.
Single industries provide a particularly important context for examining resources
critical to the industries and markets in question. However, the tradeoff of
single-industry studies is the generalizability of the empirical findings (Dess,
Ireland, & Hitt, 1990).
Events studies from finance have been used to examine the effects of
executives’ strategic decisions on a large variety of issues. However, McWilliams
and Siegel (1997) argued that this methodology needs to be appropriately applied
with theory that clearly shows a connection to stock market evaluation.
Rather than adopting the received method of large-scale data collection
approaches, the case study methodology may be appropriate for the RBV research
because it can provide much richer information about the firms’ idiosyncrasies.
More sophisticated case methodologies have been adopted by Collis (1991), Doz
(1996), Hitt, Harrison, Ireland, and Best (1998) and Kotha (1995), including
detailed field-based case studies, collection of both archival and interview data,
and in-depth case studies, respectively.
In summary, the RBV of the firm has provided important new insights into
corporate strategy (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). However, there has been limited
empirical research testing the theory (Farjoun, 1994). Empirical research on
resource-based corporate strategy has been particularly difficult because key
concepts such as tacit knowledge or capabilities resist direct measurement (Rob-
ins & Wiersema, 1995). Nonetheless, RBV researchers have already made great
strides in overcoming these empirical problems. Attempts to quantify empirically
443R.E. HOSKISSON, M.A. HITT, W.P. WAN AND D. YIU
JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, VOL. 25, NO. 3, 1999
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016jom.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
the nature and effects of resource-based constructs offer a fruitful avenue for
future research.
Future Directions
The greatest challenge, and at the same time the most interesting aspect, of
strategic management as a scholarly discipline is the ever-evolving nature of its
research. The fluidity of many strategic issues requires strategy researchers to
keep advancing the extant body of knowledge. As we approach the new mille-
nium, the new competitive landscape, constituted by rapid technological changes
and increasing globalization, will continue to pose different research questions for
strategic management researchers (Bettis & Hitt, 1995). Strategic researchers will
be increasingly challenged to respond to frequent, discontinuous changes and
provide answers to new problems. In fact, the results of strategic management
research will become increasingly important for current executives and in edu-
cating future executives (e.g., MBA programs). As such, the quality of this
research and its ability to provide answers to critical strategy questions takes on
a new urgency with the highly dynamic competitive landscape (Hitt et al., 1998).
Because the nature of strategy problems cannot easily be framed within a
fixed paradigm, strategic management is necessarily a multi-paradigmatic disci-
pline, requiring varied theoretical perspectives and methodologies. Furthermore,
as Rumelt et al. contended, “Strategic management as a field of inquiry is firmly
grounded in practice and exists because of the importance of its subject” (1994:
9). As a result, because of the practical nature of the field, strategic management
is likely to continue to flourish by using a wide variety of theoretical perspectives
and methodologies in order to help explain firm performance.
Theories
From an IO economics perspective, mobility barriers or market positions are
the critical sources of competitive advantages that lead to superior performance.
Organizational economics is more concerned with devising appropriate gover-
nance mechanisms or contracts to help reduce transaction or agency costs.
However, the advance of RBV has refocused the field of strategic management on
the firm’s internal characteristics and views firms’ internal resources as the source
of competitive advantage. While all three theoretical perspectives have signifi-
cantly advanced our understanding of the sources of competitive advantages and
hence firm performance, the sustainability of firms’ competitive advantages has
increasingly become an important question, because the new competitive land-
scape forces firms to continue to evaluate the sustainability of their positions
(Bettis & Hitt, 1995; Hitt, 1998; Porter, 1996). Consequently, some strategic
management researchers are advocating the importance of dynamic core compe-
tencies (Lei et al., 1996) or the understanding of firms’ market positions from a
dynamic theoretical perspective (Porter, 1991). The dynamic nature of firm
resources, or more generally firms’ strategic flexibility (Hitt, 1998; Hitt, Keats, &
DeMarie, 1998; Sanchez, 1995), makes the study of the sources and sustainability
of competitive advantages an important research objective. As valuable knowl-
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edge and resources become transient, organizational learning (Nonaka, 1991;
Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995), by definition a dynamic process, is likely to be
incorporated into many theoretical models for the study of strategy.
Rapid change in technology and the rise of the information age means that
the nature and pace of firm competition are likely to be different (Brown &
Eisenhardt, 1995; Hitt, Keats, & DeMarie, 1998; Stimpert & Duhaime, 1997).
Oftentimes, competitors strive to overcome others’ technological capabilities,
rendering the current technological standard obsolete. Firms are less inclined to
attempt to break competitors’ mobility barriers; instead, an increasing number of
firms are trying to develop a new game. Technological discontinuities (Tushman
& Andersen, 1986) and hypercompetition (D’Aveni, 1994) are becoming the
norm in the new competitive landscape.
Parallel to the rapid technological change is the increased level of global-
ization. As firms compete in the global market, the competitive resources and
positions of firms become more complex. Hence, it is more difficult for strategic
management researchers to examine research questions using a single theoretical
framework. Increasingly, researchers are integrating multiple theoretical frame-
works to explain complex international strategic issues (e.g., Hitt, Hoskisson, &
Kim, 1997). The sustainability of competitive resources obtained from the global
market may represent a different dimension for firm competition. These resources
can be obtained from global level learning by means of foreign subsidiaries or
through strategic alliances. Cooperative strategies (Osborn & Hagedoorn, 1997),
especially network strategy (Gomes-Casseres, 1996) on an international scale,
continue to shape the trajectory, nature and pattern of business competition.
Challenging issues such as international alliance partner selection (Dacin, Hitt, &
Levitas, 1997) and acquisition of new knowledge or technology (Hitt, Ireland, &
Hoskisson, 1997; Singh, 1995) are likely to capture the attention of many strategic
management researchers in the near future.
Related to the issue of globalization is the importance of the institutional
context of international research. There is no theoretical work nor empirical
findings suggesting that the existing body of knowledge, largely obtained in the
context of the United States, is equally applicable in other countries. Boyacigiller
and Adler (1991) expressed similar concerns about the applicability of organiza-
tion science’s theories and research in a global context. In a similar vein, firm
strategies, organization structures, and governance mechanisms successfully pur-
sued and implemented in a particular institutional context may not achieve the
same outcomes in another institutional context. The universality of specific
competitive advantages increasingly will be called into question. These issues are
explored in a Special Research Forum on Strategies in Emerging Economies of
the Academy of Management Journal (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, in press).
Certainly, more research is required that accounts for the institutional differences
among geographic or cultural environments. For instance, Porter (1998b) has
recently suggested that geographic clusters of interrelated firms (e.g., Silicon
Valley; Pouder & St. John, 1996) are magnets for foreign investment.
In contrast to agency theory, a new approach to understanding top manage-
ment motivation and actions is stewardship theory (Davis, Schoorman, & Donald-
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son, 1997). Stewardship theory suggests that managers are “stewards” of the
firm’s assets and are not motivated by individual goals. The manager as steward
believes there is greater utility in collective (organizational) behavior and, thus,
seeks to attain the goals of the organization. According to Davis et al. (1997),
stewardship theory is not in juxtaposition to agency theory; rather it helps explain
some managerial behavior in addition to agency theory. Thus, it helps provide a
more complete understanding of managerial behavior by adding to our knowl-
edge. However, “because stewardship theory is relatively new, its theoretic
contribution has not been adequately established” (Davis et al., 1997, p. 21).
Therefore, more theoretical and, importantly, more empirical research is needed
to understand stewardship theory’s specific theoretical contribution to strategic
management and to test its theoretical propositions through empirical research.
Finally, Dess et al. (1995) called for more integrating research across two or
more levels of strategy. Specifically, they argued that most strategy research
focuses on a single level of strategy, international, corporate-level or business-
level strategy. However, most large multibusiness organizations formulate and
implement strategies at all three levels. We understand little about the interaction
of different strategies at different levels. Certainly, they are linked to sets of
resources and may be highly interrelated. For example, a firm that is moving into
new international markets may have to implement an integrated low cost-differ-
entiation business strategy to be competitive in global markets (Hitt, Ireland, &
Hoskisson, 1997). Dess et al. (1995) suggest that soon such integrative research
may not represent a choice but rather be required for strategic management
scholars. Such integration will require examining multiple theoretical perspectives
along with the focus on multiple levels. To this can be added the need to examine
the differential effects of the environment on large and small firms and the
variance in competitive actions and responses (strategies employed) by size of the
firm (Dean et al., 1998). Thus, future research of this nature will be highly
complex, but also valuable.
Therefore, the field of strategic management will likely experience increas-
ing integration of multiple theoretical paradigms. Explanations of the future trends
also suggest a balance between internal and external explanations of the complex
relationships in the new competitive landscape. To meet this challenge, strategic
management researchers must continue to advance existing theories, regardless of
the complexity. The fruitfulness of the discipline depends to a large extent on the
success of meeting this challenge.
Methodologies
In light of the future complexity and variety of the issues facing strategic
managment researchers, the methodologies used will likewise reflect a similar
level of complexity. Depending on the research questions under study, we have
witnessed the use of a wide variety of methodological tools such as event studies
(e.g., Wright & Ferris, 1997), event history analysis (e.g., Blodgett, 1992; Zajac
& Westphal, 1996), structural equation modeling (Hitt et al., 1996; Hoskisson et
al., 1994), multi-dimensional scaling (e.g., Hitt, Nixon, Hoskisson, & Kochhar, in
press; Stuart & Podolny, 1996), panel data analysis (e.g., Gimeno & Woo, 1996),
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repertory grid (e.g., Ginsberg, 1988, 1989), cognitive mapping (e.g., Barr, Stim-
pert, & Huff, 1992), and policy capturing (e.g., Hitt & Tyler, 1991; Hitt et al.,
1997). More recently, newer methods, such as network analysis (e.g., Gulati,
1995), heterogeneous diffusion models (e.g., Greve, 1996), and sample selection
models (e.g., Barnett, Greve, & Park, 1994) are being employed in strategic
management research. As indicated by Hitt, Gimeno, and Hoskisson’s (1998)
recent review, different types of research methods are likely to be adopted by
strategy researchers tackling different research questions.
The choice of quantitative methods or qualitative methods has been the
subject of controversy and the apparent “dominance” of more quantitative-based
methodological tools in the development of the field does not mean that these
tools are applicable to all research questions. The recent advance of the RBV has
posed new challenges regarding the use of quantitative methods, although some
researchers have attempted to use coarse-grained measures (e.g., Chatterjee &
Wernerfelt, 1991; Kochhar et al., 1996; Miller & Shamsie, 1996) or large sample
data (e.g., Markides & Williamson, 1994) to test RBV arguments. However, due
to the intangible nature of important firm resources, researchers have used detailed
field-based study, longitudinal case studies, outlier samples, and case surveys
(e.g., Collis, 1991; Doz, 1996; Hitt et al., 1998; Larsson, 1993) to test RBV
hypotheses.
Because of the challenges posed by new research questions, we will likely
see the continued use of different research methods in the field of strategic
management. The research question and context should dictate the choice of the
appropriate research methods. In all likelihood, results obtained from different
methods have the potential to enrich our understanding of the problems and
generate new insights regarding the issues. Moreover, the integration of quanti-
tative and qualitative methodological tools (e.g., Hitt, Gimeno, & Hoskisson,
1998; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992) is likely to be a fruitful course, especially because
of the reemphasis on issues inside the firm through the RBV.
Conclusion
Looking back at the past several decades of development in strategic man-
agement, we have seen that each pendulum swing has taken us to new theoretical
paradigms and methodological approaches. Perhaps more importantly, the pen-
dulum swings enlarge the domain of the field and lead us to address a wider
variety of research questions. Later research paradigms have benefited from
earlier ones, thereby enriching the field’s total body of knowledge. These pendu-
lum swings help accumulate newer theories and methodologies.
Although the advent of the RBV apparently takes the field back to our
starting point, the level of theoretical and methodological sophistication and
maturity currently exhibited underscores the extent that the field has advanced
over the last several decades. Research based on IO and organizational economics
continues to progress, but is mostly tracking the path of strategic management.
With each swing of the pendulum, the field of strategic management has made
significant progress and will continue to flourish into the next millenium.
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Notes
1. Gordon and Howell (1959: cf. Porter & McKibbin, 1988; Schendel & Hofer, 1979), in the Ford Foundation-
sponsored study of business school curriculum, recommended that there should be a capstone course in
“business policy” that provides the students with an opportunity to integrate what they have learned in the
separate business fields and make use of the knowledge to analyze complex business problems of the general
manager.
2. Chandler noted that although he did not read Penrose’s (1959) work until after he had completed his own
work, the two works were in support of each other. Especially relevant were Penrose’s (1959) Chapter 5
“Inherited Resources and the Directions of Expansion” and Chapter 7 “The Economics of Diversification”
(1962: 453).
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